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In the recent philosophy of social science literature, we notice an increasing support for 
mechanism-based social explanations. Earlier pleas for social mechanisms used to be closely 
linked to defenses of methodological individualism. However, more recent contributions 
seem to be loosening that link and developing a more sophisticated account – ascribing a 
less important role to micro-foundations (e.g. Ylikoski 2012, Little 2012). In this paper, I want 
to review the impact of the mechanism-approach on methodological individualism and draw 
more radical conclusions as regards the individualism/holism debate, severing the link 
between the social mechanisms-approach and individualism. Four steps will be taken:  
 
(a) We should consider more than two levels of social explanation.  
 
Several advocates of the mechanism-based approach to social explanations have been 
defending the relative explanatory autonomy of meso-level explanations (e.g. Little, 2012). 
This adds a welcome extra explanatory level in between the individualist micro-level and the 
macro-level. As such, it supersedes the dichotomous thinking in the individualism/holism 
debate in which there would always be an individual micro-level – which would always be 
the same (cf. point (b) below) – that is contrasted with a macro-level.  
 
(b) The levels of explanation are perspectival levels; neither absolute, nor unique.  
 
However, the advocacy of meso-level explanations still comes with a microfoundations 
requirement. Let us first zoom in on microfoundations (for the requirement, see step (c) 
below). In the philosophy of social science debate, the microfoundations are usually 
understood as individual-level microfoundations, see, for instance, most recent work on 
analytical sociology. It is presupposed that there is some comprehensive, unique, and 
privileged individual level, the level of individual actors (cf. Ylikoski 2012). However, 
microfoundations do not necessarily have to be understood in that way. They could also just 
be understood as looking for foundations on any lower-level, e.g., on a sub-individual level 
focussing on cognitive capacities and processes that might be important in explaining certain 
social phenomena. The latter understanding of microfoundations would be more in line with 
actual social scientific practice in which we notice that the specification and amount of levels 
of explanation is perspectival, depending on the phenomena, research approaches and 
explanatory interests involved. Thus, the micro in microfoundations should be understood as 
perspectival too, rather than absolute or unique. 
 
 
 
 
(c) Seeking for microfoundations ánd seeking for macrofoundations are good heuristics.  
 
Next, let us scrutinize the microfoundations requirement. This requirement stipulates “that 
all social facts, social structures, and social causal properties depend ultimately on facts 
about individuals within socially defined circumstances. Social ascriptions require 
microfoundations at the level of individuals in concrete social relationships.” (Little 2012, 
p.138) Advocates of the social mechanisms approach have often been defending that a 
macro-explanation would never be satisfactory, or, could only be satisfactory if a micro-level 
part of the social explanation was provided, e.g. Hedström and Swedberg (1998). Thus, they 
consider a reference to (individual actions on) the individual, micro-level as a condition sine 
qua non of a satisfactory explanation.  
 Daniel Little develops a different position. According to him, the microfoundations 
requirement should not be understood as a condition for satisfactory explanations, but 
rather as a form of confirmation or justification of a macro-explanation (cf. Little 2012). Here 
as well Little takes into account the actual explanatory practice of social scientists and he 
avoids the ontological fallacies (i.e., mixing up ontological and explanatory issues) made by 
earlier advocates of microfoundations. However, Little’s requirement remains vague. It 
should be understood as constraining explanatory practice, but how would that exactly 
work? How is the microfoundations requirement operationalised (and how would it 
interfere with our explanatory practice)?  
Petri Ylikoski (2012) ascribes a special role to microfoundations as explanantia of 
constitutive explanations. I will give counterexamples that question this alleged special role.  
 In short, the more recent accounts of the microfoundations requirement are more 
sophisticated than earlier accounts, but they still remain problematic as I will show. A fruitful 
role one could see for a microfoundations pursuit is as an engagement to compare one’s 
own explanatory practice and research approach with other practices and approaches. This 
might result in more interaction between different approaches through which approaches 
articulate themselves and their relations to others more explicitly and through which the 
strengths and weaknesses of the respective approaches are clarified. In this respect, we 
could not only encourage seeking for microfoundations as a heuristic, but, on the same 
basis, propose searching for macrofoundations as a fruitful heuristic. (Some use the term 
macrofoundations, but given that we think of it as something higher up, one could also use 
macro-roof or macro-covering.)  
 
(d) there are no general preference rules with respect to the level of social explanations. 
 
This brings me to the fourth step in which we have to draw more radical conclusions than 
Little and Ylikoski as concerns the impact of the social mechanisms-approach on 
methodological individualism and sever the link between the social mechanisms-approach 
and individualism. The social mechanisms approach has a lot to offer to help clarifying the 
explanatory reasoning going on in social science, but it cannot be used to make a case for 
methodological individualism. The special role ascribed to microfoundations by defenders of 
mechanism-based social explanations cannot be upheld. We have to conclude that there are 
neither general preference rules with respect to the level of social explanations, nor good 
reasons for a general microfoundations requirement. 
 I will defend that the debate on social mechanisms, microfoundations, explanatory 
autonomy, etc. should not be so much about developing the ultimate individualistic 
approach or holistic approach, but rather about understanding explanatory reasoning in 
social science and optimize the way in which different explanatory approaches interact, co-
exist, can be integrated and/or develop some division of labour among each other, while 
making the best out of the strengths and limitations of the respective explanatory strategies 
of holists and individualists. Philosophers of social science might contribute in analyzing, 
visualizing and optimizing the interaction among these different approaches (as an example I 
will discuss Longino 2013 and some of my earlier work, cf. Van Bouwel, 2004, 2010, 2014, 
and Van Bouwel & Weber, 2002, 2008a, 2008b). 
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